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Tort-Law based Environmental Litigation: a Victory 
or a Warning?
“The Appeal Court confirms the judgment of the The Hague Tribunal of 24 June 
2015.” With these words on 9 October 2018 – the day before sustainability day – 
the The Hague Appeal Court closed the second, and probably not last, chap-
ter in the renown Urgenda case (ecli:nl:ghdha:2018:2591). The Dutch State 
must reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to a greater extent than envisaged 
under its current plans.
It does not bear further explanation that this judgment was welcomed as a 
success by the Urgenda association, other environmental associations, envi-
ronmentalists and concerned citizens alike. The first commentaries of Dutch 
scholars have already appeared on national newspapers and internet sites, 
with commentaries in legal journals following soon. Lucas Bergkamp, Marcel 
Crok, Jaap Hanekamp & Roel Pieterma, and Ludwig Krämer have been entrust-
ed with the task to open an in depth discussion on this judgment in the next 
volume of this journal.
Acordingly, I would like to make immediately clear that I do not want to 
judge the Urgenda ruling from a substantive perspective. As for most land 
mark cases, it can surely be both praised and criticized. In this opinion, I want 
to underline a personal concern that I have with the use of tort law to protect 
the environment which emerges when we place the Urgenda case in a broader 
perspective.
The words of Marleen van Rijswick during her keynote at the 6th eelf Con-
ference in Como, Italy (available at eelf.info), keep echoing in my mind. She 
rightly warned the audience that the Urgenda case is actually a symptom of 
problem, not a solution. It highlights the failure of the Dutch State to take cli-
mate change seriously. After hearing these words, my mind immediately made 
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a link to a proposition from the insightful book of the Italian civil law lawyer 
Natalino Irti, Codice civile e società politica (Laterza 2007, chapter 1), indicat-
ing, in essence, that any time the Constitutional charter is under pressure the 
Civil Code rises as carrier of the values of unity and stability of civil society. 
My Italian colleagues will hopefully excuse me for interpreting these words as 
meaning that civil law steps-in when public law fails to fulfil its tasks, which is 
exactly what is happening in the Netherlands in the context of climate change, 
as shown by the Urgenda case.
This safety-net function of civil law may sound reassuring to many, but the 
ongoing deployment of this safety-net in the Netherlands makes me wonder 
whether it is suitable for the task. Because if it is not, it would generate a false 
sense of assurance, which could slow down, rather than spur, environmental 
protection.
A quick excursion in the field of air quality law is necessary to better un-
derstand the potential threat embedded in the tort-law route to environmen-
tal protection. While lawyers from all over the world are familiar with the 
Urgenda case, only few (Dutch) environmental lawyers are familiar with its 
troublesome progeny in the field of air quality law. Inspired by the Urgenda 
case, non-governmental organizations and individual citizens in the Nether-
lands started tort-law based proceedings against the Netherlands to combat 
air pollution, which in the Netherlands is responsible for the premature death 
of thousands of people each year (European Environment Agency (eea), Air 
quality in Europe, 2018). As a matter of facts, at several key locations in the 
Netherlands, the national air quality standards, of clear eu derivation, are not 
complied with by the Netherlands. Dutch plans to redress the exceedances 
show that the situation will not be solved in the short term. One environmen-
tal organization, Milieudefensie, and other applicants started an Urgenda-like 
action to force the Dutch State to do more. More precisely, two actions were 
started, a summary proceedings (first instance ecli:nl:rbdha:2017:10171; ap-
peal ecli:nl:ghdha:2018:1128) and a regular one (first instance ecli:nl:rbd
ha:2017:15380). The judgment in the regular procedure is the most interesting 
one for my reflection.
On 27 December 2017, the The Hague Tribunal, as in the Urgenda case (but 
with a different composition of the chamber), rejected the claim of the appli-
cants. The tribunal reached an opposite conclusion to the one seen in the first 
instance Urgenda judgment, now confirmed in appeal.
Why? What was different in the pleadings of Milieudefensie, in comparison 
to those of Urgenda, that could justify the difference in outcomes? What was 
the difference in the reasoning of the court in the air quality case that could 
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explain the difference in the outcome in comparison to the climate law case? 
Is there an intrinsic difference between climate change law and air quality law 
that explains the two different outcomes?
Clearly, only an in depth analysis of both cases and their respective norma-
tive frameworks can answer these questions satisfactorily. My first glance read-
ing of the judgments and the relative legal frameworks only spotted a marked 
difference in the manner in which the courts looked at key elements of the 
tort-law action, namely the concepts of damage, the existence of a causal link 
and the burden of proof.
To my great dissatisfaction, I cannot understand why these concepts where 
viewed differently in these two cases. This also means that I do not know how 
the case-law will develop. The Netherlands will probably go in cassation in the 
Urgenda case; Milieudefensie filed an appeal in the air quality case. Will the 
Dutch Supreme Court change the outcome of the Urgenda case by following a 
reasoning more in line with the one of the The Hague Tribunal in the air qual-
ity case? Will the The Hague Appeal Court change the outcome of the first in-
stance judgment by following the reasoning adopted in the Urgenda (appeal) 
case? Will the difference in reasoning be maintained, presumably entailing 
that the difference in outcomes will also be maintained? Will the eventual dif-
ferences in reasoning and outcomes be explained? And more generally, what 
would happen in other environmental fields, as water law in which the Neth-
erlands is miserably failing to fulfil the Water Framework Directive objectives 
(eea, European waters – Assessment of status and pressures 2018), were tort-
law actions started to spur environmental protection?
I sincerely do not know what to expect, and surely I am not the only one. 
There is too much uncertainty at the moment to predict what the course of the 
case law would be. This means that the extent and the functioning of tort law 
as a safety net for public law shortcomings in environmental protection in the 
Netherlands is far from clear.
At the moment, beginning a tort-law action to protect the environment is 
similar to taking a gamble. This uncertainty can hardly have a positive effect 
for civil society in general, and environmental protection in particular. Argu-
ably, the only party that benefits from this uncertainty is the State. The State 
could use this uncertainty to avoid reforming public law, both from a substan-
tive and a procedural perspective. It can decide to wait until a civil court rules 
on whatever shortcoming as regards the achievement of environmental qual-
ity standards before considering developing and implementing effective poli-
cies. In fact, this hypothesis is not far from what is occurring in the field of air 
quality law.
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In light of the above, I warn the readers of this journal not to cheer blindly 
to the developments originating in the Netherlands. The Urgenda case is only 
a piece of the puzzle. We should reflect upon the question of whether tort-law 
based environmental litigation should not be seen as a dire warning, before 
embracing it as a victory.
Lorenzo Squintani
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